

HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY

**ATTACK REPORT**

## **Silent Lynx APT: Espionage Operations Targeting Central Asia's Critical Infrastructure**

Date of Publication

November 6, 2025

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025337

# Summary

**First Seen:** Late 2024

**Targeted Regions:** Central Asia (Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), Russia, Azerbaijan, China

**Targeted Platforms:** Windows

**Targeted Industries:** Government, Diplomats, Think-tanks, Finance, Mining, Transport & Communications


**Threat Actor:** Silent Lynx ( aka YoroTrooper, Sturgeon Phisher, Cavalry Werewolf, ShadowSilk)

**Malware:** Silent Loader, LAPLAS, SilentSweeper

**Campaign:** Operation Peek-a-Baku

**Attack:** Silent Lynx is an APT group conducting espionage across Central Asia since late 2024, targeting government, diplomatic, and infrastructure entities through phishing campaigns themed around regional summits. Their operation “Peek-A-Baku” uses malicious RAR or ZIP attachments that deploy PowerShell-based loaders and custom implants like Silent Loader and LAPLAS. The group leverages GitHub, Ligolo-ng, and Telegram for command-and-control, blending legitimate services with malicious traffic. Ongoing activity indicates sustained intelligence-gathering focused on Central Asian geopolitical and economic affairs.

## Attack Regions



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# Attack Details

## #1

Silent Lynx is an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group active since late 2024, conducting cyber-espionage campaigns primarily across Central Asia, with a focus on governmental, diplomatic, financial, and strategic infrastructure sectors. The campaign, tracked as Operation “Peek-A-Baku”, seeks to collect sensitive political and economic intelligence, especially information related to regional initiatives under the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA). Attribution analysis suggests the actor may operate out of Kazakhstan, with notable overlaps in tooling and objectives with the espionage group YoroTrooper, indicating potential shared resources or collaboration.

## #2

The group’s targeting is highly selective and aligned with key geopolitical events. Lures often reference diplomatic summits and strategic cooperation meetings in Dushanbe, Astana, and Baku, using email attachments themed around policy or infrastructure topics such as mining and transport corridors, including the China-Tajikistan Highway. These spear-phishing campaigns use RAR or ZIP archives containing malicious LNK or ISO files, which deliver PowerShell stagers disguised behind decoy documents. While the social-engineering content is contextually relevant, language inconsistencies in filenames suggest automation or non-native Russian proficiency.

## #3

Technically, Silent Lynx uses a multi-stage infection chain that combines custom malware with open-source utilities. The attack sequence typically begins with an LNK shortcut that launches a Base64-encoded PowerShell script, hosted on GitHub, to download and execute implants. Key tools include Silent Loader (C++ loader with PowerShell payloads), LAPLAS (C++ reverse shell using TCP/TLS), and SilentSweeper (.NET implant). To maintain access and conceal activity, the group employs Ligolo-ng, an open-source tunneling tool, allowing encrypted command and data traffic to flow through compromised hosts.

## #4

Silent Lynx’s infrastructure spans multiple countries, with command-and-control (C2) servers identified in Russia and the Netherlands. Some variants also use Telegram bots with hardcoded tokens for issuing commands and exfiltrating data, a tactic that enhances stealth but has also exposed operational details during analysis. The actor demonstrates moderate technical capability, relying on persistent reuse of infrastructure, open-source tooling, and encoding techniques that balance simplicity with effectiveness against traditional defenses.

# Recommendations



**Restrict PowerShell usage:** Enforce Constrained Language Mode for non-admin users. Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging and Module Logging (Event IDs 4103, 4104) to capture encoded commands.



**Block risky file types:** Configure email gateways to quarantine RAR, ISO, and LNK attachments, which Silent Lynx uses in phishing campaigns. Use sandbox detonation for compressed or password-protected archives before delivery.



**Monitor encoded command patterns:** Hunt for powershell.exe instances using -EncodedCommand, -nop, or -w hidden arguments. Alert on any PowerShell execution chained from explorer.exe, winword.exe, or Outlook processes.



**Network filtering:** Block known C2 IPs and domains. Detect outbound traffic to GitHub raw URLs used as payload hosts. Monitor for Ligolo-ng tunneling behavior unusual, persistent TLS or TCP connections to unfamiliar IPs on nonstandard ports.



**Application allowlisting:** Use Windows AppLocker or WDAC to prevent execution of unauthorized binaries and scripts in user directories.



## Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<b><u>TA0001</u></b> Initial Access	<b><u>TA0002</u></b> Execution	<b><u>TA0003</u></b> Persistence	<b><u>TA0010</u></b> Exfiltration
<b><u>TA0005</u></b> Defense Evasion	<b><u>TA0004</u></b> Privilege Escalation	<b><u>TA0011</u></b> Command and Control	<b><u>T1053</u></b> Scheduled Task/Job
<b><u>TA0011</u></b> Command and Control	<b><u>T1566.001</u></b> Spearphishing Attachment	<b><u>T1566</u></b> Phishing	<b><u>T1204</u></b> User Execution

<b><u>T1027</u></b> Obfuscated Files or Information	<b><u>T1059</u></b> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<b><u>T1027.013</u></b> Encrypted/Encoded File	<b><u>T1204.002</u></b> Malicious File
<b><u>T1204.001</u></b> Malicious Link	<b><u>T1106</u></b> Native API	<b><u>T1053.005</u></b> Scheduled Task	<b><u>T1053</u></b> Scheduled Task/Job
<b><u>T1059.001</u></b> PowerShell	<b><u>T1036</u></b> Masquerading	<b><u>T1095</u></b> Non-Application Layer Protocol	<b><u>T1090</u></b> Proxy
<b><u>T1041</u></b> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	<b><u>T1059.005</u></b> Visual Basic	<b><u>T1547.009</u></b> Shortcut Modification	<b><u>T1547</u></b> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
<b><u>T1071.001</u></b> Web Protocols	<b><u>T1071</u></b> Application Layer Protocol	<b><u>T1572</u></b> Protocol Tunneling	<b><u>T1567</u></b> Exfiltration Over Web Service

## ✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
<b>IPv4</b>	62[.]113[.]66[.]137, 206[.]189[.]11[.]142, 62[.]113[.]66[.]7, 37[.]18[.]27[.]27, 62[.][.]113[.]66[.]7
<b>Host Names</b>	updates-check-microsoft[.]ddns[.]net, catalog-update-update-microsoft[.]serveftp[.]com
<b>URL</b>	hxxp[:]//206[.]189[.]11[.]142/

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	ef627bad812c25a665e886044217371f9e817770b892f65cff5877b 02458374e, 5b58133de33e818e082a5661d151326bce5eeddea0ef4d860024c1 dbb9f94639, 5bae9c364ee4f89af83e1c7d3d6ee93e7f2ea7bd72f9da47d78a88a b5cfbd5d4, 72a36e1da800b5acec485ba8fa603cd2713de4ecc78498fcb5d306fc 3e448c7b, 5e3533df6aa40e86063dd0c9d1cd235f4523d8a67d864aa958403d 7b3273eaaf, b58f672e7fe22b3a41b507211480c660003823f814d58c04334ca9b 7cdd01f92, ae51aef21ea4b422ef0c7eb025356e45d1ce405d66afbb3f6479d10 d0600bcfd, 0bce0e213690120afc94b53390d93a8874562de5ddcc5511c7b9b9 d95cf8a15d, 821f1ee371482bfa9b5ff1aff33705ed16e0147a9375d7a9969974c4 3b9e16e8, 262f9c63c46a0c20d1feecbd0cad75dcb8f731aa5982fef47d2a8721 7ecda45b, 123901fa1f91f68dacd9ec972e2137be7e1586f69e419fc12d82ab36 2ace0ba9, 6cb54ec004ff8b311e73ef8a8f69b8dd043b7b84c5499f4c6d79d462 cea941d8, 97969978799100c7be211b9bf8a152bbd826ba6cb55377284537b3 81a4814216, 9de8bbc961ff450332f40935b739d6d546f4b2abf45aec713e86b37 b0799526d, b5a4f459bdf7947f27474840062cfce14ee2b1a0ef84da100679bc4 aa2fcf77, ffda4f894ca784ce34386c52b18d61c399eb2fc8c9af721933a5de1a 8fff9e1b, 2c8efe6eb9f02bf003d489e846111ef3c6cab32168e6f02af7396e93 938118dd, 1531f13142fc0ebfb7b406d99a02ec6441fc9e40725fe2d2ac111197 80995cd3, 67cf0e32ad30a594442be87a99882fa4ac86494994eee23bdd2133 7adb804d3f, 036a60aa2c62c8a9be89a2060e4300476aef1af2fd4d3dd8cac1bb2 86c520959, 32035c9d3b81ad72913f8db42038fcf6d95b51d4d84208067fe22cf 6323f133c,

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	a639a9043334dcd95e7cd239f8816851517ebb3850c6066a4f64ac39281242a3, a83a8eb3b522c4517b8512f7f4e9335485fd5684b8653cde7f3b9b65c432fa81, 26aca51d555a0ea6d80715d8c6a9f49fea158dee11631735e16ea75c443a5802, 303f03ae338fddfe77c6afab496ea5c3593d7831571ce697e2253d4b6ca8a69a, 40d4d7b0bc47b1d30167dd7fc9bd6bd34d99b8e0ae2c4537f94716e58e7a5aeb, b0ac155b99bc5cf17ecfd8d3c26037456bc59643344a3a30a92e2c71c4c6ce8d, b87712a6eea5310319043414eabe69462e12738d4f460e66a59c3acb5f30e32e

## References


<https://www.segrite.com/blog/operation-peek-a-baku-silent-lynx-apt-dushanbe-espionage/>

<https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/silent-lynx-campaigns-targeting-central-asian-governments/>

# What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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**November 6, 2025 • 7:30 AM**

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